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Available online xxxxThe role of China in the world economy is constantly growing. In particular we observe that it
playsmore andmore important role in the support of theworld economic growth (aswell as high
prices of certain very important commodities). In the meantime the perspectives of the Chinese
economy (as well as possible fates of the Chinese society) remain unclear, whereas respective
forecasts look rather contradictory. That is why the search for new aspects and modes of analysis
of possible development of China turns out to be rather important for the forecasting of global
futures. This article employs a combination of scientificmethods that imply (a) the analysis at the
level of Chinese economic model; (b) the analysis at regional level (at this level the Chinese
economic model is compared with the regional East Asian model); (c) the analysis at the global
level that relies on the modified world-system approach that allows to answer the question
whether China will replace the USA as the global leader. It is important that the analysis is
conducted simultaneously in economic, social, demographic, and political dimensions.
As regards the analysis of specific features of the Chinese model as an especial type of the East
Asian model (that is based on the export orientation, capital & technology importation, as well
as cheap labor force), we note as organic features of the Chinese model the totalitarian power
of the Communist Party and the immenseness of resources. As regards special features of the
Chinese model, we note (in addition to “cheap ecology” and cheap labor force) and emphasize
that China has a multilevel (in a way unique) system of growth driving forces, where, as
opposed to developed states, the dominant role belongs not to native private capital, but to
state corporations, local authorities and foreign business. This explains the peculiarities of the
Chinese investment (or rather overinvestment), which determines high growth rate up to a
very significant degree. A unique feature of the Chinese model is the competition of provinces
and territories for investments and high growth indicators.
As regards perspectives of the global hegemony of China, we intend to demonstrate that, on
the one hand, economic and political positions of China will strengthen in the forthcoming
decades, but, on the other hand, China, assuming all possible future success, will be unable to
take the USA position in the World System. We believe that in a direct connection with the
development of globalization processes the hegemony cycle pattern is likely to come to its end,
which will lead to the World System reconfiguration and the emergence of its new structure
that will allow the World System to continue its further development without a hegemon.
Finally, the article describes some possible scenarios of the development of China. We
demonstrate that China could hardly avoid serious difficulties and critical situations (including
those connected with demographic problems); however, there could be different scenarios of
how China will deal with the forthcoming crisis. We also come to the conclusion that it would
be better for China to achieve a slowdown to moderate growth rates (that would allow ChinaKeywords:
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at any cost to explosive growth rates attested in the 2000s.
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The role of China in the world economy is constantly
growing. In particular we observe that it plays more and
more important roles in the support of the world economic
growth (as well as high prices of certain very important
commodities). In the meantime the perspectives of the
Chinese economy (as well as possible fates of the Chinese
society) remain unclear, whereas respective forecasts look
rather contradictory. That is why the search for new aspects
and modes of analysis of possible development of China turns
out to be rather important for the forecasting of global
futures. In the meantime, researchers tend not to have an
adequate vision of how the world hegemony situation may
change as a result. We confront the prevalence of simplified
ideas that either the USA will continue the global leadership
in the forthcoming decades, or it will be replaced by China in
this capacity. Note that this approach implies that the output
volume correlates almost perfectly with a state's position in the
World System. We do not find the study of the future within
this dichotomy fruitful. We believe that in a direct connection
with the development of globalization processes the hegemony
cycle pattern is likely to come to its end, which will lead to the
World System reconfiguration and the emergence of its new
structure that will allow the World System to continue its
further development without a hegemon.
2. Theoretical framework
In this research we have relied on the following theories
and theoretical/methodological approaches:
1) World-system approach and the hegemony cycle theory
(Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1988, 2003, 2004;
Modelski, 1987, 1996; Kennedy, 1987; Thompson, 1988,
2010; Goldstein, 1988; Modelski and Thompson, 1996;
Arrighi, 1994; Frank, 1998; Harkavy, 1999; Knutsen, 1999;
Friedman and Chase-Dunn, 2005; Chase-Dunn and Ander-
son, 2005; Korotayev, 2005, 2007; Korotayev et al., 2006;
GrininandKorotayev,2012;BabonesandChase-Dunn,2012).
2) Theories of Great Divergence and Great Convergence
(catch-up) (Gerschenkron, 1952; Solow, 1956; Caselli et al.,
1996; Quah, 1996; Bianchi, 1997; Jones, 1997; Lee et al.,
1997; Pomeranz, 2000; Islam, 2003; Sala-i-Martin, 2006; Ho,
2006; Epstein et al., 2007; Goldstone, 2008, 2012; Caggiano
and Leonida, 2009; Clark, 2008; Sadik, 2008; Allen, 2011;
Korotayev et al., 2011a,b; Villaverde and Maza, 2011;
Korotayev and de Munck, 2013; Korotayev and Zinkina,
2014; Spence, 2011; Derviş, 2012; Rodrik, 2013).
3) Theory of East Asian development model (see, e.g., Berger,
1986; Berger and Hsiao, 1988; Inoue et al., 1993; Ito and
Krueger, 1995; Unger and Chan, 1995; Okuda, 1997; Aoki
et al., 1997; Lee, 2002; Yusuf et al., 2004; Perkins, 2013);
note that the development of East Asian countries inWill the explosive growth of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
6.023recent decades provided the most salient examples of the
convergence/catch-up processes (see, e.g., Lin, 2003,
2011; Lin et al., 2003; Wong and Goh, 2014).
4) The middle income trap theory. As defined by Aiyar et al.,
the “middle-income trap” is “the phenomenon of hitherto
rapidly growing economies stagnating at middle-income
levels and failing to graduate into the ranks of high-income
countries”(Aiyaretal.,2013:3;foradetaileddescriptionofthe
factorsandmechanismsofthemiddleincometrapseeKharas
and Kohli, 2011; see also Kohli and Mukherjee, 2011; The
WorldBankandtheDevelopmentResearchCenteroftheState
CouncilofthePeople'sRepublicofChina,2012:12;Cai,2012).
5) Theories of the correlation between political development and
economic growth (Barro, 1996; Liew, 2001; United Nations
Development Program, 2002; Polterovich and Popov, 2007).
6) Scenario methodology (e.g.., Wright et al., 2013a,b;
O'Brien and Meadows, 2013; MacKay and Tambeau,
2013; Wilkinson et al., 2013).
7) Demographic dividend theory (Mason, 2001, 2007; Bloom
et al., 2001; Bloom and Sevilla, 2002).
This theoretical framework has conditioned the choice of
key variables that we have chosen in order to analyze the
development of China — such as GDP, technological innova-
tion rates, labor force, population age and sex structure.
3. Recent trends in the development of China
Every year China is mentioned more and more in mass
media and the Internet, which reflects the growing global
role of this country. Our perceptions of China do not catch up
with its development. Some people admire Chinese progress
(see, e.g., Lau et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2003; Lin, 2011), others
are frightened of it (e.g., Bernstein and Munro, 1998;
Goldstein, 2013), the Chinese phenomenon is used to
corroborate various ideas, conceptions and forecasts —
ranging from the forthcoming Chinese global hegemony
(e.g., Campbell, 2008; Hutchinson, 2013; Mugomba and
Bekker, 2013; Kelly, 2014) to the collapse/disintegration of
China (e.g., Chang, 2001; Javers, 2009; STRATFOR, 2010: 6).
In the present article we intend to demonstrate that, on
the one hand, economic and political positions of China will
strengthen in the forthcoming decades, but, on the other
hand, China, assuming all possible future success, will be
unable to take the USA position in the World System (cf.
Grinin and Korotayev, 2011). The present article suggests
that the limitations of the Chinese global hegemony are
embedded within the model of the Chinese development
itself, as a result of which its strengths turn out to be its
weaknesses. We will show what the strengths and the
defects of modern Chinese model of economic development
are; whether it is possible to readjust it. Will the per capita
GDP in China be able to reach the Japanese levels in the
foreseeable future avoiding the fall into the “middle income
3L. Grinin et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2014) xxx–xxxtrap”?1 Why are the Chinese GDP growth rates likely to
continue slowing down? And, finally, why does it appear
more preferable for China to stabilize its growth rate at a
lower level rather than to try to return at any cost explosive
growth rate in the 2000s? Finally, the article describes some
possible scenarios of the development of China. We demon-
strate that China could hardly avoid serious difficulties and
critical situations (including those connected with demo-
graphic problems); however, there could be different sce-
narios of how China will deal with the forthcoming crisis.
4. The World System reconﬁguration and China
4.1. Forthcoming loss of global leadership by the USA and its
possible consequences
Just about 10 years ago possibilities of the Pax Amer-
icana emergence were discussed quite seriously (see, e.g.,
Renwick, 2000; Nye, 2002; Bacevich, 2002). Those projects
do not appear to have survived through the past decade
that has demonstrated a rather high degree of limitedness
of the American might — as well as a pronounced trend
toward its decline. The perspectives of the USA way out
of its system crisis (including the debt crisis) are rather
vague.
Thus, the economic role of the USA (and other “devel-
oped”/high-income OECD countries) — as the core of World
System — has weakened in a rather substantial way. This role
is very likely to experience further weakening in the
foreseeable future, whereas the USA's position as the World
System hegemon will diminish (there are plenty of forecasts
of the same kind, see, e.g., Frank, 1997; Arrighi, 1994, 2007;
Todd, 2003; Buchanan, 2002; Mandelbaum, 2005; National
Intelligence Council [NIC], 2008, 2012; for more detail on those
forecasts see Grinin and Korotayev, 2010, 2011). And many
US experts are very concerned with this (Mandelbaum, 2005;
NIC, 2008, 2012).
However, notwithstanding the abovementioned trends
toward the decline of the US role and the increase in the
significance of China, it appears inappropriate to speak about
a mere change of the global hegemon. The world has changed
in a very significant way, and this is why we believe that in
the forthcoming decades it is highly improbable that a new
leader will be a single state (see Grinin, 2012; Grinin and
Korotayev, 2010 for more detail). There are twomain reasons
for this. Firstly, as the USA role diminishes and globalization
develops, the World System configuration will follow some
other trajectories, some lines of association and integration,
so the role of separate states will diminish, but that of their
coalitions and alliances will grow (whereas same countries
will simultaneously participate in many associations). Sec-
ondly, in the foreseeable future the emergence of a state
capable of substituting for the USA with its range of
leadership functions — from military to ideological ones
(Ibid.; see also below) — is impossible, as the United States'
position in this respect is unique. For these (and many other)1 For more detail on the middle income trap see, e.g., The World Bank and
the Development Research Center of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China(2012: 12); Aiyar et al.(2013: 3); Kharas and Kohli(2011);
Kohli and Mukherjee(2011); andCai(2012).
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rather hard and challenging transformation of the World
System itself; and even the immediate effects are not clear
(for our analysis of these consequences see Grinin and
Korotayev, 2010).
4.2. Why is China not America?
Now let us consider what follows from the above
statements with respect to an analysis of China's future
place in the World System and in particular, why China
cannot be a real candidate to take the number-one slot from
the USA. The assumption that China will become such a
leader, in fact, proceeds from the current rapid growth which
in the next decades will enable it, first, to overtake the USA in
GDP, and then to catch up with the developed states in
overall production per capita. This means that with its one
and a half billion population China will become incredibly
powerful.
As a matter of fact such an approach is based on two quite
obscure premises:
1) the high growth rate could be sustained for a very long
time; and
2) the production volume correlates with a state's position in
the World System in an almost perfect way.
Actually both premises are wrong. The resources for a
rapid growth in China are quite limited (on this see below),
and due to many reasons to have the biggest gross product in
the world does not at all translate into becoming the World
System hegemon.
One of the major factors is that today the political,
military, financial, monetary, economic, cultural, technolog-
ical, innovative and ideological leadership is concentrated in
the USA. This mere listing indicates that no one can take the
position in the World System similar to that of the USA, as no
one can simultaneously put together so many leading
functions (see also Zakaria, 2009). What is more — such a
position of a state within the World System is unique for the
whole of the world history.
Moreover, it is quite obvious, that almost all these aspects
of leadership will be inapproachable for China (for some
aspects see Fischer, 2010; Herrington, 2011). In particular,
China has huge gold and foreign currency reserves, with
which it is able to apply certain pressure on the USA in some
cases. But the undervalued yuan (renminbi/RMB) and severe
regulation of many financial activities will prevent China
from becoming the leading financial, not to mention
currency, world center. Yes, China pushes the yuan rather
actively forward, it arranges currency swaps with its trading
partners and declares that in future the RMB will become
freely convertible. But is it realistic to expect this for the
forthcoming years? We believe that this scenario is not
very realistic, because to make the yuan freely convertible
into other currencies means to revalue it and to sharply
deteriorate export opportunities, i.e. to undermine the
foundations of the Chinese growth model and to open the
flood-gates to import.
Great Britain in the 19th century or the USSR in the 20th
century had ideologies that could be objects of admiration
and emulation in other countries, whereas the USA up to theh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
2 With the present rates of economic growth China may already reach this
level in 2016–2017, i.e. just in 2 or 3 years.
3 The so-called Huáqiáo, that is ethnic Chinese, living in other countries
among which there are many businessmen.
4 L. Grinin et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2014) xxx–xxxpresent day have such an ideology that still possesses many
elements that attract hundreds of millions in dozens of
developing states. And what can China offer the world with
respect to ideology? Virtually nothing, as in China itself fewer
and fewer people believe in official Chinese Marxism and
socialism (see, e.g., Wang, 2010). On the other hand, in China
the number of admirers of the Western values obviously
increases (see, e.g. Hairong Lai, 2011). The state that is
incapable of proposing an attractive ideology to the world
and besides fearing revolution in its own country cannot be
the world leader.
Below we will also demonstrate that China is rather
unlikely to become the World System leader in many other
respects — as regards innovations, productivity of labor, level
of life, and so on.
5. The Chinese model
Nevertheless, although China is incapable of becoming the
World System's valid leader, its rapid development itself
appears an influential factor in the near future of that system.
The world economy and environment to a large extent
depend on how long China will sustain rapid growth and
what growth model it will choose. Thus, it is necessary to
analyze the main features and peculiarities of the Chinese
development pattern, taking into account that China changes
rapidly and that the development model remains substan-
tially the same, but the major problems together with the
state pass to a new level and continue to accompany this
development.
To comprehend the Chinese model, it is worth consider-
ing several aspects: what factors generally favored such a
rapid and long-lasting growth as well as the rise of Chinese
economy's technological level? What reserves underlay the
growth and what is their present condition?We will describe
the characteristics of the Chinese model in its evolution and
then analyze what will hamper the economy growth in
short- and long-term perspectives.
5.1. The Chinese model: general features
The Chinese model is highly debatable. Many analysts
entirely disclaim its existence, while others consider it almost
universal, i.e. suitable for many developing countries (see,
e.g., Ramo, 2005; Long and Ping, 2012). The most relevant
seems the numerous analysts' opinion which regards it as a
variant of the East Asian model of economic development,
which in its turn may be considered as a salient example of
the convergence (“catch-up”) that are constantly growing in
strength in the recent decades (e.g., Lin, 2003, 2011; Lin et al.,
2003). This model originally emerged in post-war Japan, and
then it was implemented in the so-called ‘Asian tigers’ —
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong (see, e.g.,
Berger, 1986; Berger and Hsiao, 1988; Inoue et al., 1993; Ito
and Krueger, 1995; Okuda, 1997; Aoki et al., 1997; Lee, 2002).
Later it was adopted by China and to some extent by
the ASEAN states (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines), and much later — by Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
and some others; that is, this model spread through South
East Asia and the Pacific Basin.Please cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive growt
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essential peculiarities (see, e.g., Lau et al., 2000; Breslin, 2011
with respect to China). But its basic features are as follows:
a) export-oriented economy (and, especially, export-oriented
industry); b) cheap labor force; c) mobilization of foreign
investments and creation of favorable business environment,
as well as active importing of technology; d) large investment
ratio in GDP (very large share of gross fixed capital formation,
from 30 to 40% and evenmore); e) an active (but to a different
extent) state participation in economic development; f) also
the creation of special economic zones in China and some
other countries; g) state authoritarianism in different versions
and/or a one-party model — e.g., the development of Japan
(and Taiwan) was controlled by one party for a long time —
and precisely during the period of the modernization break-
through. The latter secures a necessary degree of stability to a
country during this period.
This model — to a larger or lesser extent in different
countries — provides a high economic growth rate for a long
period, and due to the attraction of capital and investments it
makes possible to improve technology and enhance labor
productivity. As a result the state is modernized, urbanization
rapidly increases, and living standards gradually grow.
Nevertheless, with GDP per capita and domestic consump-
tion increase, the growth rate in the states of the East Asian
model slows down. The slower development growth gives
reason to some analysts to suppose that after China reaches a
certain GDP per capita (no more than $10,000, PPP2), one will
observe a much more sizeable slowdown of the economic
growth rates in comparison with what observed between
2007 and 2012 (see Fig. 1) (see Eichengreen, 2011).
6. The Chinese model: peculiar features
All the pointed features are intrinsic to the East Asian
model, in general, and the Chinese model, in particular. But it
also has some very significant peculiar traits. The first
(unique) one is the huge population. It is the population
(plus large territory and possession of nuclear weapons) that
makes China a superpower. The second is the greatest (in
comparison with other countries) role of the state with the
Communist party at the helm. Its role is crucial in the Chinese
model, all the more so because it has made the reforms
possible. The third trait is a peculiar position of the peasants
who have rather limited land rights (let alone private
property of land) and lack many other civil rights. This has
allowed using rural resources for the purposes of state and
economic growth. The fourth results from ethnically Chinese
overseas capital3 and the existence of whole states/special
administrative regions with Chinese population (Hong Kong,
Macau, Taiwan, and — to some extent — Singapore). No
doubt, the foreign investment and technology transmission
(e.g.. Tsai and Li, 2009) flow to China would have been much
smaller, because huge (sometimes most) foreign investments
(as well as pseudo-investments) are still channeled this way.
Besides it should be noted that the impulse of Hong Kong andh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
4 The roots of this competition may be traced to Mao's attempts to create a
certain “parallelism” within the Chinese national economy in order to
facilitate the formation of autonomous bases of resistance in case of war
(Qian, 1999).
Data source: World Bank 2014.
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Fig. 1. Dynamics of the annual GDP growth rates in the People's Republic of
China, %, 1977–2012. Data source: World Bank, 2014.
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growth.
These fundamental characteristics of the Chinese model
(first of all, the high role of the state together with an
obedient population lacking many civil rights) combined
with the peculiarities of Chinese reforms and the period
favorable for economic growth in the world caused a number
of additional significant features which are both the constit-
uents of Chinese success as well as its potential weaknesses,
namely:
• ‘Cheap ecology’ (an insufficient concern for environmental
protection);
• cheap social policy which hardly burdens the state (the
government can renounce its obligation with respect to old
age pensions and allowances for a large segment of the
population; fee-paid education and medical service; low
industrial safety rate etc.);
• “one child family” policy which reduces expenditures on
the coming generation;
• undervalued RMB that supports export. Its low exchange
rate prevented China from the 1997 crisis; while a number
of other Southeast Asian states suffered significantly from
their overrated currencies;
• a very high share of the gross fixed capital formation in GDP
that provides the accumulation of capital which allows
making solid investments and maintain high growth rate,
but is only possible with such an active participation of
state in economy as is observed in China;
• deliberate state policy with respect to low energy and raw
material tariffs and costs, creation of infrastructure, labor
productivity enhancement, innovativeness, degree of state
openness etc.
As for the last point it is worth noting the tendency to
gradually increase openness for foreign investments — a sphere
where China has had the most success (in comparison with its
policy of promoting domestic business or developing domestic
demand). All these provided the priority rates of Chinese export
relative to general economic growth (Harrold, 1995; Chen et al.,
1995; Pomfret, 1997; Liu et al., 2002; Shan, 2002; Yueh, 2013),
whereas the foreign investment increased tenfold (on the
general success of Chinese reforms as well as some difficulties
associated with them see Lin et al., 2003; Lin, 2003, 2011;
Perkins, 1986, 1988, 2013; Yusuf et al., 2006, etc.).Please cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive growt
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Speaking about factors of extraordinary economic growth,
first of all one should point to the Chinese leaders' qualifications,
as well as the state machine's and whole society's focus on
success and growth. The growth in China has really been
turned into a fetish. The aforementioned constantly broaden-
ing opportunities for foreign and (to a lesser extent) domestic
enterprise development deserve attention as particular factors
of growth.
Permanent economic growth factors are (as mentioned
above): a) extremely high investment rate (in certain years
up to 50% of GDP); b) huge foreign capital flow; and c) labor
productivity growth. Due to continuous technological mod-
ernization one observes impressive development (see, e.g.,
Perkins, 2013), yet in comparison with developed countries,
labor efficiency in China remains quite low.
The most significant sources of Chinese growth were (and
more or less still are) as follows: a) large reserves of cheap labor
force (that looked inexhaustible for a rather long period of time)
and the so-called demographic dividend (connected with a low
birth rate and ‘young’ population structure); b) rather plentiful
supplies of some mineral resources (coal, iron ore, oil, rare
metals etc.); as well as two sources that we have already
mentioned, that is — c) ‘cheap ecology’ and d) ‘cheap’ social
policy (because of a very low age dependency ratio combined
with opportunities to disregard many social needs).
An analysis of driving forces of Chinese economy is of
principal importance for the comprehension of the reasons for
China's rapid growth and its further development perspectives.
In connection with the forthcoming exhaustion of the cheap
labor reserves, itmay be said that at present China only has three
main sources of growth: export orientation, investments
(foreign and domestic), and competition between provinces.
And, as we will see below, there are evident problems with the
continuation of the export orientation aswell as the attraction of
the foreign investments.
The main agents of investments and production expan-
sion are, firstly, private entrepreneurs. But the role of local
entrepreneurs in China is smaller than that in the developed
countries, as they have little access to credits and are
constrained by many restrictions, while foreign investments
enjoy fewer restrictions. Secondly, these are authorities at all
levels: from the central government determining the main
objectives, rates and costly projects, to the level of provinces
(which, however, in terms of population surpass some large
European countries), and to the prefectures, counties, and
townships. So, there is a multilevel participation of the state
(and party) in industrial development and investments. At
the same time, at provincial and local levels one can observe
a competition for investments and high growth indicators.
According to economist John Lee from Sidney these domestic
investments give 40% of growth while the export sector and
FDI contribute about 30% (see Berthelsen, 2011; Heshmati
and Kumbhakar, 2011: 577; Qian and Roland, 1998; Li and
Zhou, 20054).h of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
6 L. Grinin et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2014) xxx–xxxTo conceivewhat themechanisms for development are, it is
extremely important to understand that the Chinese govern-
ment managed to arouse the internal forces of the local and
provincial management apparatus which is very much inter-
ested in the economic growth. As a result, the local authorities'
impact on the economic development is even larger than it was
in the USSR and, in our opinion, is more considerable than in
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan during the previous decades,
which brings China additional growth rates. Yet, if one
evaluates the central government's role in China and in the
abovementioned countries it appears quite similar.
Finally, the functions of a powerful growth engine are
performed by large state corporations (including monopo-
lies) aiming at investing their profits in new projects later
approved and controlled by the state through credits, etc. In
such situation some quite useful projects are combined in a
rather fancy way with absolutely ineffective or quite
unnecessary ones.
Thus, China has a multilevel (in a unique way) system of
growth driving forces, where, as opposed to developed states,
the dominant role belongs not to native private capital, but to
state corporations, local authorities and foreign business. this
explains the peculiarities Of Chinese investments.
6.2. Limitations and drawbacks of the Chinese model
The Chinese economy in spite of the fact that its
technology and innovative level is increasing, remains
generally extensive (e.g., Kuijs, 2012: 7), based on extremely
huge resources and capitals involved. At the same time it still
remains: a) too resource-intensive; b) too energy-intensive;
c) extremely polluting; and d) too much export-oriented.
Note also that in the first decades of reforms the investments
brought very high returns; however, by the early 2000s the
investment effectiveness had declined very substantially
(e.g., see Hu Angang, 2005: 38–39). In 2000–2007 China
managed to increase the effectiveness of investments, but
after the onset of the global crisis it started declining again. Of
course, at present this is a global trend; however, in Western
countries the volume of investments does not increase (or
even declines), whereas in China the problem of the
decreasing effectiveness of investments is amplified by the
attempts undertaken by the Chinese state to support very
high economic growth rates precisely through additional
investments whose annual volume in recent years has
become close to 50% of the Chinese GDP (or even exceeded
it) (ADB, 2012; Yueh, 2013: R4).
So in some crucial points the Chinese model becomes
inefficient,which is likely to lead to crises and growth slowdown.
The Chinese leaders are quite aware of the problems of
the existing growth model. They continue setting the
objectives to transform it and make efforts to do so.
Nevertheless, despite a certain progress the results fall short
of what must be expected (see, e.g., The World Bank and the
Development Research Center of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China, 2012).
7. Slowdown of the Chinese growth
At present one may observe clear limitations in the way of
extremely high economic growth rates of China within itsPlease cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive growt
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take into account the point that it is very difficult to change
such a model; on the other hand, if such attempts are
successful, this will imply a rather significant slowdown of
the Chinese economy's growth. In 2012 the annual growth
rate of the Chinese economy decreased to 7.7% (note that this
would still look like a dream for most other economies of the
world). In late 2012 and early 2013 this rate somehow
increased in a direct relation with the change of the supreme
political administration of the People's Republic of China.
That is why our point on inevitable slowdown of the Chinese
economic growth rates in the near future needs a certain
clarification.
As Fig. 1 indicates, in China the annual GDP growth rates
reached their peak in 2007, after which they tend to slow
down, though they still remain very high. One may suggest
that it is the global crisis that is responsible for this
slowdown, and the Chinese growth rates will return to the
extremely high pre-crisis levels as soon as the global crisis is
over. However, there are grounds to maintain that the crisis
just accelerated rather logical processes that would have
proceeded in any case. On the one hand, within the Chinese
growth rate dynamics one appears to observe an evident
cyclical component with a period that is rather close to the
one of classical Juglar cycles. Actually both Chinese and
non-Chinese economists put forward the idea of a special
Chinese economic cycle quite long ago (see, e.g., Selishchev
and Selishchev, 2004: Chapter 7for more detail). If the
cyclical component continues to be traced in the Chinese
economic dynamics, one may suggest that the observed
slowdown is still a temporary phenomenon tightly connect-
ed with the downswing phase of the respective cycle,
whereas one would expect that the Chinese growth rates
will become extremely high again at the forthcoming
upswing phase. However, we believe that though the cyclical
component is very likely to continue to be present in the
Chinese economic dynamics, it is as likely to be
superimposed over the overall downward trend, and the
Chinese annual growth rates will hardly reach two-digit
numbers for any significant period of time any more. On the
other hand, the process of slowdown will not be monotonous
or linear.
As we have already mentioned, we agree with the point
that the global positions of China are likely to continue
strengthening for a certain period of time in the near future.
Yet, this will be accompanied by the slowdown (notwith-
standing all the likely fluctuations). And, to our mind, the
main intrigue of the future Chinese scenarios is how the
Chinese administration (and the Chinese society in general)
will react on the inevitability of this slowdown — will China
be able to avoid the middle income trap without serious
perturbations? Or will it encounter a serious crisis whose
social and political consequences might be unpredictable.
8. Growth limits
1. Scarcity of energy resources and raw materials sharply
manifests itself as China does not provide itself with
energy and raw materials anymore and depends heavily
on import. At the same time the increasing import of fuel,
mineral and other resources drives the world prices whichh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
5 The Gini coefﬁcient (a measure of income inequality) is very high in
China. It is higher than in Russia, India and the USA and yields only to
countries of Latin America and South Africa, though according to some
reports it has already overtaken some of them and reached 0.57 (see, e.g.,
Berthelsen, 2011).
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present export-led model the dependence on energy and
resources consumption will only increase. Thus, in the
near future the scarcity of both Chinese and world
resources will become the most severe obstacle to Chinese
growth, or the resource prices will turn out to be
overwhelming for China.
The growth of the resource consumption may only
experience a significant slowdown in case of the slow-
down of the economic growth rates (and, most likely,
involuntary one) — the statistic results of 2012 indicate
just this: the slowdown of the economic growth led to
substantial decline of the resource consumption growth.
2. The coming labor shortage and its increasing cost (we will
consider these points below — together with the other
demographic problems of China).
3. An inevitable appreciation of export production and the
risk of capital inflow reduction. Assuming that the
export-led model is difficult to change, the severe
restrictions like the costs of energy, raw materials, labor,
and other expenditures, a probable revaluation of the yuan
and rivalry of the states with cheaper labor force will be an
obstacle for sustaining export growth. But once growth
decelerates, the investment flow will decrease as it is
mainly joint ventures with foreign capital participation
that are engaged in export. Simultaneously, export capital
can go up significantly, which will also lead to a slowdown
in economic growth.
In 2012, one could observe the export growth deceleration
and reduction of foreign investments. Foreign direct
investment in the PRC declined by 3.7%. Moreover, FDI in
production fell by 6%. The cause is in the growth of labor's
cost, protests against environmental pollution and, per-
haps, anti-Japanese sentiments, forcing Japanese compa-
nies to move out to other countries. The tendency has
continued in early 2013. Then the situation improved
again, but in any case we appear to be dealing with
precursors of future serious difficulties.
4. The decline of investment returns has already been
mentioned above. We would add that the burden of
maintaining the unprofitable facilities increases every
year. China has an enormous number of excessive facilities
almost in all spheres. It is not infrequent that the
government forces closures of excessive facilities; none-
theless, their number keeps growing. This results both in
unnecessary expenses and excessive competition which
reduce profit. Of course, this cannot go on endlessly, and
sooner or later the investments will decrease, accompa-
nied by a lower growth rate.
5. Environment. By all accounts the environment degrada-
tion is critical (see, e.g., Steenhof and Fulton, 2007a,b;
Angel and Rock, 2009; He, 2010: 158–159; Zitan, 2013).
The solution to this problem requires huge funding which
will raise the production and export values and affect the
growth rate (as has already been observed with the
developed countries of the West at a comparable phase
of their development [see, e.g., Korotayev and Bogevolnov,
2010; Korotayev et al., 2010: 53–55]).
6. The increasing social expenditures. Population aging,
rising living standards, the necessity to maintain social
peace and to prevent the development of an extreme gapPlease cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive growt
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responsibilities and expenditures. Every year China has to
spend more for social needs; that has already had a certain
impact, and in medium- and especially in long-term
perspectives it will become a heavy burden. The govern-
ment tries to transfer social expenditures onto employers.
On the one hand, it looks quite fair; but, on the other hand,
this will naturally lead to the growth of prime costs, and
the decrease of the employers' readiness to create new
jobs.
Of course, one may say that the majority of developed
countries have similar problems. However, one should not
forget that, officially, the People's Republic of China is a
socialist state, which implies that its government has
much higher levels of responsibilities with respect to the
country's population in comparison with ordinary devel-
oping countries.
The problem of the growth of social expenditures in China
may be considered as one of the factors that could cause
China to find itself in the middle income trap, as the
growth of social expenditures will lead to an increase of
the prime costs of the Chinese products, which may
negatively affect the export potential of this country, as
well as facilitate the competition of imports for the
Chinese internal market.
7. The danger of inflation, growing disproportions and the
necessity to restrain the inequality development have a
severe impact on economic policy and growth rate. China
has an abnormally high Gini coefficient (see Yu, 2013).5 In
March 2011, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao declared
that the combination of inflation, corruption and income
disparity between rich and poor can influence social
stability and even political power strength. Thus, the
most important resource of the Chinese model — people
loyalty — is challenged.9. Demographic problems
Despite high absolute numbers of the unemployed, one
can already observe labor shortages in many places. It is
forecasted that after 2015 the labor force deficit will be
gradually increasing—reaching the annual rate of 10 million;
as a result between 2015 and 2035 the working age
population of China will shrink by 115 million (see, e.g.,
NIC, 2012: 15; Akaev et al., 2013: Chapter 12). There are still
quite large numbers of excessive working hands in the
countryside; however, the system of hukou (registration)
impedes the free movement of villagers to the cities. On the
other hand, the fast growth of the urban population due to
the migration from the countryside (that is still very likely in
the forthcoming years) will imply a very fast growth of
expenditures to support health care, education and pension
systems (which is hardly compatible with the Chinese model
of “cheap population”).h of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
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8 L. Grinin et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2014) xxx–xxxA rather sharp labor force deficit will only be felt in the
medium-term perspective; however, any decrease of the
surplus labor force will affect positively the wage dynamics
tending to lead to the increase in their levels as well as in the
levels of the workers' demands. With a limited labor force
and wage-push, it will be very difficult (or just unlikely) to
maintain very high growth rates. As Fig. 2 suggests, China is
about to stop receiving its “demographic bonus”, and in the
forthcoming years the transformation of the age structure
will start working in the opposite direction. Indeed, a very
sharp decrease of the age dependency ratio was achieved in
recent decades due to an accelerated completion of the
demographic transition in a direct connection with a fast
decrease in the fertility rates produced largely by the “one
child family” policy. However, the process of the decrease of
the share of the under-15 age cohort in the total population
of China has already reached its limit. In the meantime this is
accompanied by an accelerating increase in the retirement
age population cohorts.
The growing pension load will place a heavy burden on
the Chinese economy, and, against the background of the
slowdown of the economic growth rates, any fashionable
saving scheme will hardly be able to lift significantly the
resultant burden on the state budget.
Another very important problem is the disbalance of
males and females in the total population of China. The deficit
of brides for dozens of million young males (see Figs. 3 and 4)
may become a serious social problem and a powerful source
of social discontent.
Consider two estimates of the dynamics of that disbalance
by various authors.
It appears necessary to take into account the point that it
will be impossible to smooth the action of the gender
disproportion factor among the adult population up to the
2040s even if China abandons entirely the “one child family”
policy in 2015 (see, e.g., Akaev et al., 2013: Chapter 12).Data source: UN Population Division 2014. 
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2014.
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and constantly growing group of dissatisfied people com-
prising precisely that very part of the population — young
males — that is the most prone to violence, radicalism, and
extremism (see, e.g., Moller, 1968; Goldstone, 1991, 2002:
11–12; Korotayev and Zinkina, 2011a,b; Korotayev et al.,
2011a,b).
10. The inevitability of the growth slowdown
10.1. Why is the growth model difﬁcult to change?
The modern expensive model for growth increases the
existing and officially recognized disparity in development
level and living standards between the eastern and western
provinces, the urban and rural populations, and the rich and
poor Chinese. No wonder, that the Chinese government's
objective is to direct the economy toward innovative growth
and to enhance the contribution of knowledge economy to
the GDP growth; to develop Chinese know-how and
high-technology export; to increase domestic consumption
and make it (not foreign trade) the fundament for growth; to
lower coefficients of energy and raw material consumption;
to improve environmental conditions; to balance economy;
and so on. But this new course, designed in the late 1990s
appeared to be not quite realistic.
In short, to change the existing growth model is difficult
both due to the inertia and to the existence of influential
forces interested in its conserving and high growth rates. As
we have stated above, these are local authorities of different
levels, especially those of rich provinces, and large state or
quasi-state corporations (about state corporations' peculiar-
ities and their role see Hu, 2013). For decades they have
made great progress in production expansion as well as in
statistic figure manipulation. On the other hand, the supreme
administration of the People's Republic of China has not
really abandoned the idea to support the very high economic
growth rates at any cost. Notwithstanding the declared plan
target of 7% of annual economic growth in the period of the
12th 5-year plan, the new administration does everything it
can in order to exceed this number. No less important factor
is that Chinese bureaucratic and social system is actually
unprepared to switch to a new organization. For example,
how can one avoid overinvestment that creates additionalh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
6 With the exception of the antebellum slave-owning Southern States of
the US.
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rivalry for capital and rapid pace of their region's develop-
ment? The only instrument is the restrictive directives. But
this means to tie the provinces' hands, and, in fact, to stop the
leading growth engine (irrespective of all its irrational aspects).
In general, with the account of the above-mentioned
limitations it appears reasonable to mention that despite all
the Chinese authorities' efforts, in the short-term perspective
the most possible scenario seems to be the one forecasting a
significant deceleration of the growth rate to 5–6% in the next
five years. And further, that is after 2016, the growth rate will
decrease more. It is quite possible that China will face more
serious challenges, especially amid the deteriorating eco-
nomic environment in developed states and if the world
demand for Chinese products decreases (Europe and the USA
are its major consumers).
11. Can a developing state be the World System
economic leader?
However, consider first the most optimistic scenario of
the development of China (note that with this scenario China
is supposed to display an extremely high growth rate and
thus surpass the USA in GDP within the next decade). What
does this mean for China and the world? Will this mean that
this economic superpower with the largest GDP in the world
will become the World System hegemon. We believe, not.
Anyway, today and in the foreseeable future China has no
sufficient opportunities for that. Why? Due to a few reasons,
some of which will be spelled out by us below.
1. A rather high degree of dependence of the Chinese
economy. One should keep in mind that the dynamics,
power and progress of Chinese industry are still in many
respects connected with other (and richer as regards their
per capita GDP) economies.
2. It is impossible to become a World System hegemon,
while still remaining a developing country. And China
describes itself as a developing state. And that is not mere
rhetoric or just an attempt to gain some benefits from the
WTO. It is really so. When will the developing country
become a developed one? Even according to the Chinese
government plans it will happen in a rather distant future.
Meanwhile, an economic leader should display a high GDP
per capita, a high level of productivity and incomes. It is
very doubtful that in the near future China will enter the
top ten with respect to those indicators.
3. China will be still subjected to criticism for human rights
observance as well as for the environmental issues.
4. With the world's largest GDP China will become a very
powerful state (still remaining a poor society) that can
influence some global economic and financial trends,
including exports of capital, raw material flows, invest-
ments abroad, financial support for the least developed
countries, and so on. China is capable of turning into a
rather mighty military power (though not the first rate
one), play a noticeable role in important global economic
decision-making. China's significance in the Pacific Basin,
especially in East and South-East Asia, will increase. All the
above-mentioned are of great importance, but it is not the
same as holding the World System leader position.Please cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive growt
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stimulate political and diplomatic activity to support its own
position, to defend the rights, property, etc. But for a long
period of time China will focus on its complicated internal
problems. It will still consider all external affairs in the light
of the domestic ones, estimating whether it will provide
economic growth, resource supply and so on (see, e.g.,
Fischer, 2010). In this respect the Chinese position resembles
that of the USA in the late 19th–early 20th centuries with its
policy of isolationism at the time of booming economic
growth. Such a comparison can help answer the question if
China will manage to take the USA path and become the
World System leader. But the comparison reveals quite
fundamental distinctions:
1. Not yet laying claim to leadership, the USA in the late 19th
century became the leading economic power, having gone
ahead of Great Britain and Germany as regards its GDP,
and having caught up with Britain as regards its GDP per
capita.
2. Labor productivity in the USA was very high, in some
respects the highest one in the world (due to labor
shortage — the case opposite to the Chinese one). (On the
low labor productivity in China (especially in agriculture)
see, e.g., Akaev et al., 2013).
3. The USA was generally recognized as an innovative leader
in technology and management at the beginning of the
20th century (Frederick Taylor's Principles of Scientific
Management, Henry Ford's assembly line, etc.) and even
earlier in some respects. As to China's economy, it
develops on the base of non-innovative and even outdated
technologies. On the other hand, in recent years China has
achieved a rather significant progress in this field (e.g.,
Kim et al., 2009; Ma et al., 2009; Hu and Phillips, 2011;
Zhang and Gao, 2011; Lai et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012;
Xiang et al., 2013; Motoyama et al., 2014; Fuller, 2014
TFS***). Today China ranks third in the world in terms of
the number of patents; in addition, China's output of
research articles has expanded in a very significant way
(Kostoff et al., 2007a,b,c; Kostoff, 2012); a very high
number of patent grants attested in the recent years in
China is very important; yet, a rather pronounced
accelerating dynamics is of no less importance (see, e.g.,
Liu and Sun, 2009; Tseng, 2009; The World Bank…, 2012:
177; Boeing and Sandner, 2011: 17; WIPO, 2014; see also
Fig. 5). However, there significant obstacles in this way
(e.g., Miller et al., 2011), and economy generally remains
non-innovative (Zhang et al., 2012).
4. Low wages is the fundamental aspect of the Chinese rapid
growth model. Meanwhile, in the USA in the late 19th
century (in fact, since its foundation) the wages were
significantly higher than in Europe, which stimulated the
flow of immigrants.
5. The USA economy (in contrast with the economy of China)
has never been export-oriented (see, e.g., Held et al.,
1999).6
In addition, one may mention the British ascendance to
the World System hegemony in the late 18th and early 19thh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
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one of France; and up to the 1820s the British GDP was
smaller than the GDP of France (and, incidentally, China); the
foundation for the British global hegemony was laid by the
technological breakthrough in connection with the industrial
revolution.
Finally, history allows drawing one more conclusion.
Economic might does not automatically transform into
political hegemony. The USA after a short outburst of
geopolitical activity between 1917 and 1920 returned to its
traditional isolationism and even in the late 1930s the USA
still unwillingly engaged with European policy, maintaining
neutrality during the civil war in Spain and ignoring the war
between Japan and China, and so on. Only the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor finally changed the situation. However, for
the present we can hardly believe that in the nearest decades
the world will find itself in the situation to propose the leader
position to China.
12. An attempt of long-term forecasting
Consider various scenarios of the future development of
China. Of course, at present it appears impossible to describe0
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Fig. 5. Dynamics of the number of patents granted in the PRC, 1985–2010.
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point of view can still be expected by the end of this decade—
or the beginning of the next — if, of course, the Chinese
leadership fails to work out and implement the optimum
development strategy. Thus, it appears reasonable to suggest
some tentative scenarios.
The optimistic scenario implies that the Chinese economy
after the slowdown of its growth still retains such growth
rates that are higher than in the USA. In this case China will
outstrip the USA in this decade, or the beginning of the next.
This scenario will be discussed in more detail later. At this
point we will just mention that we do not consider this
scenario to be the most probable due to the formidability of
problems that we have described above.
As we have alreadymentioned in the beginning, the worst
scenarios suggested by some analysts predict disintegration
of China (or even rebellions and civil wars). Such scenarios
are not without certain grounds. In particular, one should not
forget that China includes vast territories with non-Chinese
population, whereas the colloquial Chinese is actually a
conglomerate of a few closely related Sinitic languages united
by a single writing system. In addition, there are marked
differences betweenmoremarket-oriented (and— currently—
much richer) coastal provinces and more state-oriented (and
poorer) inland areas (especially in the Yellow River basin).
Thus, a certain threat of the decline of the country's unity does
exists. However, throughout the very long history of China the
unity of the Chinese nation tended to prevail over division and
disintegration, which suggests that the scenarios forecasting
the preservation of the countries unity are more realistic
(especially, against the background of still fresh memories of
the disastrous civil war).
We have to leave aside numerous intermediate variants
and to concentrate on just one of the possible scenarios of the
Chinese crisis, the one that we consider to be the most
probable. Within this scenario the Chinese GDP may still
become the largest in the world. Yet, this scenario will be
connected with the growing problems in the way of the
future development of China. China possesses immense
resources, a great safety margin, and a considerable experi-
ence of solving very difficult problems. All these are veryh of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
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certain period of time. However, if the main efforts of the
Chinese administration are aimed at the supporting of the
current very high growth rates at any cost (which would
result in the postponement of the solving of many
medium-term and long-term problems), this may lead to a
very serious structural socioeconomic (and even political)
crisis in China.
The necessity to reform the political system of China may
constitute the most serious threat. There is a significant
contradiction here that could hardly be eliminated. On the
one hand, the satisfactory solving of the problems is only
possible with the continuation of the dominance of the
Communist Party of China. On the other hand, China's
political system which has greatly contributed to its success
will be more and more frequently criticized at home and
abroad. The criticism will intensify coupled with growing
living standards and middle class population. The transition
from authoritarianism to democracy is not only problematic
but also very dangerous and can cause destabilization,
extension of populism and the country's disintegration (in
this respect, the USSR is a very instructive example).
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that some circumstances,
social expectations or internal political struggle (combined
with outside pressure) will make leaders take that direction.
The fact that the Chinese people have never lived under
democracy can lead to a severe government crisis and affect
economic development.7 With the weakening of the Com-
munist Party of China one may expect developments rather
similar to the ones observed during the Russian crisis of the
1990s: criminalization of political power, disbalances in the
state policy, concentration on momentary tasks, renunciation
of the earlier goals of economic growth, which is very likely
to lead to the economic decay.
Such a crisis may continue for 15–20 years (as China may
need a change of generations in order to unravel the tangle of
accumulated contradictions and problems). On the basis of
the experience of many post-Communist countries (includ-
ing Russia) one can observe that such a crisis may be very
difficult to overcome. The slowdown of the economic growth
will naturally lead to the slowdown of the growth of the level
of life of the majority of the Chinese population (or even its
decline for a certain period of time). The attempts to
influence this will affect the situation both positively and
negatively — especially, as regards the financial sphere
leading to mass bankruptcies, financial frauds, and growing
disproportions in a direct connection with all these. The
possible structural crisis in China is also very likely to be
accompanied by the growth of criminalization and increasing
property grabs. The weakening of the growth impulse
(combined with the growing negative phenomena in eco-
nomic and social spheres) may lead to fluctuations in the
upper levels of the political administrations, as well as to the
increasing intensity of political intrigues. Within such a
context one could also expect fluctuations of attitudes
toward private entrepreneurship, increasing confrontation7 We agree with those researchers who point out that “the transition
period to democratic governance is one of the most unstable and tenuous
periods a state can experience” (Cox et al., 2009: 34; see also, e.g., Goldstone
et al., 2010; Herrington, 2011).
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connected by the urge toward the growth and expansion),
and sharp oscillations in social policy.
The crisis may last for the 2020s and 2030s; on the other
hand, the sliding down into the crisis may continue
for a rather long time (for example, for the 2020s till all
the possibilities for growth are exhausted) — in this case
the crisis may start in the 2030s (when, as a result of
the exhaustion of economic and demographic resources, the
political power will weaken, and the opposition will grow in
strength) and continue in the 2040s. Such a scenario looks
even more plausible.
13. Conclusion
Thus, what is the answer to the question placed in the title
of this article? Will the explosive growth of China continue?
We believe we have given a rather unequivocal answer to
this question. The explosive growth of China is bound to
come to its end. On the other hand, there is no unambiguous
answer to the question of the possible outcomes of such a
transformation. Here, one of the main problems is connected
to the point that sooner or later China will face the necessity
to change its political system.8 At this point China will face a
very serious threat. Will China be able to pass this threshold
without deep shocks? This will depend on the shape in which
China will approach this point, on how controllable it will be,
as well as on the possibilities to reform the political system
gradually.
In this respect it appears appropriate to discuss two
possible alternatives. The first would correspond to such a
scenario when the Chinese administration is unable to
modify sufficiently the economic model, when it tries to
support the extremely high growth rates (which seem to
legitimize the Chinese leadership) at any cost. This is the
“hard landing” scenario that will lead to the increasing
malfunction of the economic “machine” of China. Sooner or
later the moment will come when the citizens' expectations
exceed too much the government's possibilities, and its
authority will be shaken. If the Communist Party continues to
be considered responsible for everything, if it continues not
to have any realistic alternative, if citizens continue to believe
that all their problems stem from the bad government, then
there will be a really high probability of the country's rolling
into a very serious and prolonged sociopolitical crisis.
The second scenario may be called not just one of the “soft
landing”, but rather one of planned and coordinated
restructuring of the Chinese economic and political model.
This scenario will only become plausible if the Chinese
leadership realizes that political relationships in a society
that has achieved a certain level of the well-being are bound
to be changed (as they changed in South Korea, in Taiwan
and other successful Asian societies). And the more
prolonged and softer changes are, the lighter the transition
will be. We believe that a steady, organized, and planned
slowdown of the economic growth may transform the8 Some hints that the new Chinese leadership still recognizes the
necessity of profound reforms, in general, and political reforms in particular
may be also found in the “inauguration speech” (as well as some other
speeches) of the new Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping.
h of China continue?, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2014),
12 L. Grinin et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2014) xxx–xxxpresent-day Chinese takeoff into a smooth and steady growth
with slower rates. Within such a scenario we would consider
as a great success the annual per capita GDP growth rate of
4–5% being achieved for a considerable number of years. Note
that such a slowdown of economic growth rates may produce
a number of positive effects, contributing to the elimination
of those disproportions that were accumulated during the
years of explosive growth.
Such a smooth growth will be able to secure China's
escape from the medium income trap, whereas the released
energy could be used by the Chinese administration to
prepare and perform in a smooth way sociopolitical changes
while retaining a necessary degree of control. As we have
demonstrated above, China does not have sufficient reserves
to support extremely high growth rates. But we believe that
it has sufficient reserves in order to solve a very complicated
task of the necessary deep transformation of its development
model. And the earlier this transformation will start the more
chances will China have to avoid “the hard landing”. Planned
and gradual slowdown of the growth rates will allow the
country to preserve its stability, whereas the main portion of
the economic growth will take place through the expansion
of the internal demand of households. This will be accompa-
nied by the growth of the cultural level of the population and
the increase in the effectiveness of legal mechanisms of
economic regulation with a possible growth of the signifi-
cance of local businessmen. This will also allow a rather safe
introduction of certain elements of democracy (that can well
be a sort of “controllable democracy” in the beginning).
It does not appear appropriate to provide here a detailed
description of a planned restructuring of the Chinese
economic model. Note that in the forthcoming three decades
(as we have already mentioned above) the transition of
China to the innovation-intensive trajectory may be (para-
doxically) facilitated in a rather significant way the inevitable
colossal (by more than 100 million) decline of the Chinese
working-age population. This will be a very powerful factor
decreasing the threat of unemployment, as well as a major
stimulus to increase the productivity of labor (which actually
implies the growth of incomes that will tend to stimulate the
expansion of the internal demand). The decrease of the labor
force in China may also help this country to solve finally the
problem of an extremely low labor productivity in the
Chinese agriculture — behind which one could easily find a
very low level of incomes of the Chinese peasants (who not
so long ago constituted the majority of population of this
country), and, hence, a very narrow internal market (at
which one had no chance to sell the output of the vigorously
growing Chinese industry, whereas this created its heavy
dependence on exports). The rise of Chinese agriculture and
the growth of farmers' well-being will contribute to the
broadening of the internal market and will help the Chinese
industry to overcome its acute dependence on the external
markets. In addition, the transition of China to the model of
growth through the expansion of internal demand will finally
allow to decrease the level of economic inequality that has
reached in China colossal scale9 and that can serve as a very9 The level of economic inequality in China is even higher than in Russia
(whereas this level in Russia is one of the highest in Europe — see, e.g.
World Bank, 2014: SI.POV.GINI).
Please cite this article as: Grinin, L., et al., Will the explosive
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2014.06.023,growtpowerful potential source of political destabilization in a
country where the Communist ideals of universal equality
are still formally dominant.
Of course, the opposite side of the increase in the
population incomes will be the growth of the price of the
Chinese workforce — which will result in the decline of the
competitiveness of many items of the Chinese export (and,
hence, in the decrease of the country's attractiveness for
foreign investors). Naturally, the “soft landing” scenario also
implies certain risks (as it may even lead to a certain decline
of production, which may result in serious tensions within
the Chinese socioeconomic system that has become so
“accustomed” to vary fast economic growth rates). However,
this is the lesser of two evils.Acknowledgment
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